Security is one of the top concerns when moving the IT infrastructure and the business data to the cloud. Three common service models in the cloud are Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform As a Service (PaaS), and Software As a Service (SaaS). The focus of this work is to address the security concerns in the IaaS model. Specifically, in the IaaS model, virtual machines are often cloned from the templates to provide rapid deployment for customers. Attacks on the VM template can be catastrophic because the attacks will be replicated numerous times and negatively impact every new virtual machine, which is going to be created. Therefore, how do we prove the authenticity of the VM templates and how do we protect VM templates from being manipulated? If cryptophytic approach is applied, how long will it take to authenticate VM templates? This article studied related work and proposed a cryptography based solution to authenticate VM templates. Real virtual machine templates of different sizes were used to measure the performance of different approaches. The results show that a PKI-like strong authentication approach is not unacceptable to be used in real cloud computing environment. This study is derived from a security course project. Students learned the basics of cryptography and began to apply their knowledge in a real world setting. The study provides insights and benefits for both the cloud consumers and the cloud providers.
BACKGROUND
In a network security class, students learned the basics about how to provide confidentiality using either symmetric key encryption or asymmetric key encryptions. They have also been taught how to provide authenticity by applying techniques with Message Authentication Code (MAC). In this work, students were challenged to explore how the cryptography knowledge can be applied in real world settings. Specifically, students were encouraged to first study security concerns in cloud computing. They were then been asked to discover how cryptography can be used to enhance security in cloud computing. In order to evaluate how practical the proposed approach, they were instructed to establish a testing environment to measure the performance penalties by measuring the additional time overhead introduced due to message digest and encryptions. Essentially, the goal of this project and the research work is to raise students knowledge level from simply remembering, understanding, applying, to analyzing, evaluating and creating in the revised Bloom's taxonomy [13] .
To facilitate such tasks in the classroom, basic concepts on cryptograph were covered during the first half of the semester. Concepts, such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and non-repudiation were introduced. Modern Cryptography theories and algorithms were explained in details. Students learned that symmetric encryption could provide confidentiality. Algorithm and constructions include DES, Triple DES, AES, block cipher mode, and stream cipher (one time pad and salsa20). Cryptographically secure hashing algorithms were then introduced to elaborate how to provide integrity. The course covered MD5, SHA1, SHA2 and SHA3. This leads to the discussion on Message Authentication Code (MAC) where message digest are further protected by symmetric encryption with a shared secure key K. The concept of asymmetric encryption was then discussed to illustrate how it can be used to establish a secure session and provide message authentication by signing the message digest with the private key. Common public key based cryptography, such as Diffie-Hellmen key change, RSA, and Elliptic Curves are explained in details during the lecture.
The course does not require students to write secure code to implement the cryptography libraries. The goal is to help students understand what building blocks are and how they can be used appropriately to secure data at rest and in transmit. A few assignments were developed around the Cryptool [14] so that students can see how data is transformed during encryption and hashing process and be able to build a simple project that connects multiple blocks to fulfill security requirements. While homework was able to raise students' learning up to level 3 in Bloom's taxonomy, the project was really designed to push students' learning to the next level.
In this article, we present a work developed from this course project. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the research topic, virtual machine template validation in the cloud computing environment. Section 3 reviews the currently practices implemented by industry followed by proposed the approach in Section 4. The work is then evaluated on both Mac and PC platforms on time penalties in Section 5 and it is concluded in Section 6.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud Providers present an efficient way for providing Cloud Computing environment for their Cloud Consumers. According to the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) definition published in the NIST Special Publication SP 800-145, "Cloud Computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction." [1, 2] . This definition of NIST about Cloud computing presents five important characters of Cloud Computing, which are as follows:
 On-demand self-service  Resource pooling  Measured services  Broad network accesses  Rapid elasticity Therefore, Cloud Consumers are able to run, manage, and host Cloud services and applications, anytime and anywhere that they want. There are three common service models in the cloud, which are Infrastructure As a Service (IaaS), Platform As a Service (PaaS), and Software As a Service (SaaS). Definitions of each of them are as follows:
 IaaS provides servers, storage, networks, and operating systems for Cloud Consumers. Therefore, Cloud Consumers are able to run any applications and operating systems of their own choice on the resources, which were provided by the Cloud Provider in the IaaS.
 PaaS provides a set of tools and services designed to make coding and deploying those applications quick and efficient. Thus, Cloud Consumers are able to build their own cloud web applications.
 SaaS provides applications, which are designed for end-users and delivered over the web. Therefore, Cloud Consumers are able to use online applications. In this level of service model, Cloud Consumers need to be authorized to use provided online applications [3] .
NIST has published its Cloud Computing Reference Architecture in the Special Publication SP 500-292. In the presented Architecture, NIST tries to provide an easy way of understanding the operational intricacies in Cloud Computing [2] . There are five different parts in the NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, which are Cloud Consumer, Cloud Provider, Cloud Auditor, Cloud Broker, Cloud Carrier [4] .
Chandramouli, R., Iorga, M., and Chokhani, S. (2014) discussed cryptographic key management issues and challenges in Cloud services. As shown in Figure 1 , Cloud Consumers' visibility and accessibility to "Security and Integration" layer are different based on different Cloud service models. [3] . Figure 1 shows that when moving from SaaS to PaaS, cloud consumers gain access to the APIs provided by Cloud providers and are able to customize applications based on their needs. However, it is the cloud consumers' responsibility to secure the applications developed. In the case of IaaS, cloud consumers can rent their own virtual servers and hosts and then install necessary services and deploy their own applications as if they are working in a real physical IT environment. Cloud consumers will have more control of their IT infrastructure but also has to shoulder more responsibilities to secure their systems, virtual OS and applications.
It worth noting that the use of Virtual Machines may potentially benefit an organization not only from the perspective of cost, but also the point of view of security. Di Costanzo et al. (2012) pointed out the main benefits of deploying virtual machines are as follows:
 Server consolidation, which lets system administrators place the workloads of several underutilized servers in fewer machines;
 The ability to create VMs to run legacy code without interfering with other applications' APIs;
 Improved security through the creation of sandboxes for running applications with questionable reliability; and  Performance isolation, letting providers offer some guarantees and better quality of service to customers' applications [6] .
In cloud computing environment, a new virtual machine is most likely cloned directly from VM templates. Vulnerabilities exist in the templates will be greatly magnified and spread all over the entire cloud environment. An attacker can have direct knowledge about the standard VM configurations, patch levels, and detailed code by simply renting a new virtual server as an innocent customer. A related security problem is that an image can be taken from untrustworthy sources, where a VM template could have been manipulated so as to provide backdoor access by attackers.
In a study led by Grobauer et al. (2011), general cloud computing related vulnerabilities are examined. Two major vulnerabilities identified in the cloud computing environment are, 'virtual machine escape' and insecure or obsolete cryptography. The term 'virtual machine escape' describes a type of attack when the attacker can escape form a virtualized environment and be able to directly interact with the underlying hyper visor layer and thus posing a severe threat to the host running the virtual machines and other virtual machines that running on the same host. Insecure or obsolete cryptography attack occurs when attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities of the cryptography technique itself or the implementation issues of a sound cryptography approach. Either way, it is possible for attackers to turn strong encryptions into weaker encryptions or even no encryptions at all. In the wave of ever increasing adoptions of cloud computing paradigm, it is impossible not to apply cryptography to protect data confidentiality and integrity in the cloud. Cryptography related vulnerabilities are therefore highly relevant and more significant when addressing security in cloud computing environment [5] .
In this work, we investigate various cryptographic operations when securing VM templates. In IaaS model, a Cloud Consumer deploys its own computing resources in the form of virtual machines (VMs) or leases them from the Cloud Provider. VM templates need to be authenticated by both the Cloud Provider and the Cloud Consumer to ensure they are from authorized sources and have not been tempered in the transfer process. In order to mitigate the authentication of the VM in the cloud, Cloud Provider can use three different cryptographic techniques, listed as follows:
A. VM Template Authentication Using Digital Signature
As Figure 2 shows, VM templates can be signed by using Cloud Provider's private key. The process of authentication is as follows [3] :
1. The Cloud Provider signs VM with its own private key. 2. The Cloud Provider sends the signed VM to the Verification Engine. 3. The Cloud Provider sends the public key to the Cloud Consumer. 4. The Cloud Consumer sends the public key to the Verification Engine. 5. The Verification Engine verifies the authentication of VM template.
Figure 2. VM template authentication using digital signatures
The potential issues of this approach are: a) The Cloud Provider needs to protect private key from unauthorized use and disclosure.
b) The Cloud Provider needs to provide its own public key in a trusted way to each Cloud Consumer. c) The Cloud Consumer needs to protect private key from unauthorized modifications.
B. VM Template Authentication Using Cryptographic Hash Functions
As Figure 3 shows, using Cryptographic Hash Functions, such as SHA-256, can authenticate VM templates. This approach doesn't need any key management. The process of authentication is as follows [3] :
1. VM will be send to the Verification Engine and Hashing Engine. 2. The Hashing Engine computes the hash value of VM template. 3. The Hashing Engine sends the hash value of VM template to the Cloud Provider. 4. The Cloud Provider sends the hash value of VM template to the Cloud Consumer. 5. The Cloud Consumer sends the hash value of VM template to the Verification Engine. 6. The Verification Engine verifies the authentication of VM template by creating the hash of VM template and comparing it with the one, which was received form the Cloud Consumer. There are some points that need to be considered here, which are as follows:
a) The Cloud Provider needs to create and protect a secret key from unauthorized use and disclosure. b) The Cloud provider needs to provide the secret key in a trusted way to each Cloud Consumer. c) The Cloud Consumer needs to protect the secret key from unauthorized modifications.
All the models presented above have the following common concerns:
1. How does the Cloud Consumer communicate securely with the Verification Engine to provide the public key and to obtain the verification results? We may have to assume secure communications such as TLS/SSH are correctly implemented and deployed. 2. How does the Cloud Consumer and Verification Engine provide mutual authentication?
Can any exiting protocols be directly applied in this context? 3. If solutions exist to address the above concern, why not to apply the same approach such that the VM template can be trusted directly by the Cloud Consumer and forego the extra steps of to trust the Verification Engine? 4. How to securely protect the keys or key pairs? If someone somehow gets the key (pair), they will have access to the VM needs to be protected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents related works by using explanation of Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud. Proposed cryptographic architecture for VM template authentication is illustrated in Section 3, followed by implementation and evaluation of proposed work in Section 4. Finally paper concludes in Section 5 where recommendations and future work are presented.
RELATED WORK
In addition to the work described in Section 1, we need to examine how security is currently implemented in real life by investigating the security model of Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud.
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is the central part of Amazon.com's Cloud Computing platform, Amazon Web Services (AWS). EC2 allows business subscribers and users to rent virtual computers to run their own computer applications. EC2 provides scalable deployment of applications to cloud consumers through web services such that an instance OS image with the desired software can be created on demand. The term 'elastic' refers to the fact that users have flexibility to start and stop the instances as needed and they are only charged for the time when the servers are active and for the actual computing resources they have rented, such as the number of the CPU cores, the amount of RAMs, and etc.. In addition, EC2 provides users with control over the geographical location of instances to enable latency optimization and high levels of redundancy. In theory, the EC2 can provision unlimited number of virtual machines. It also provides resizable compute capacity in the cloud to make web-scale computing easier for developers [7, 8, 9 , 10].
Cryptographic Architecture of Amazon EC2
Based on the documents described in Amazon EC2 [8] , we inferred the Cryptographic Architecture of Amazon EC2is likely to be the process illustrated in Figure 5: 1. The Cloud Provider signs the VM with its own public key. 2. The Cloud Provider sends the signed VM template to the Verification Engine. 3. The Cloud Provider sends the private key to the Cloud Consumer. 4. The Cloud Consumer sends the public key to the Verification Engine. 5. The Verification Engine verifies the authentication of the VM template. 
Concerns in Amazon EC2
There are some concerns in the Amazon EC2 as well, which are as follows [11] :
1. Amazon is in control of your data  You don't know where it is stored or how it is stored, and you have no control over the physical access mechanisms to that data. 2. Let's assume that Amazon is doing everything right.
 What if Amazon has a major, prolonged outage?  What if they go out of business?  What if someone sues them and obtains a blanket subpoena to all data to which Amazon has access? 3. The Amazon S3 cloud storage infrastructure is weakly secured.
 The nature of the ACLs and the fact that data in the cloud is not encrypted means, however, that it is possible for you to accidently enable public access to a bucket.
Amazon EC2 provides a very helpful environment as a Could Computing Provider. However, if Cloud Consumers cannot trust this environment's security, they will not be able to use it.
PROPOSED WORK
Based on the materials in Section 1 and 2, we came up with a new Cryptographic VM template authentication model, as shown in Figure 6 . The process of VM template authentication is as follows:
1. The Hashing Engine creates the hash value of the VM template and sends it to the Cloud Provider. 2. The secret key in the Signing Engine will sign VM template and its hash value. 3. The Cloud Provider signs the VM template with its own public key. 4. The Cloud Provider sends E(k, VM || H(VM)) to the Verification Engine. 5. The Cloud Provider sends the secret key and H(VM) to the Cloud Consumer. 6. The Cloud Consumer sends the secret key and H(VM) to the Verification Engine. 7. The Verification Engine verifies the authentication of VM template.  This model can be viewed as a combination of the previous models. Therefore, an attacker getting access to the secret key alone is not able to comprise the VM template because the attacker needs to manipulate H(VM) as well.  In the proposed architecture, disclosure of either H(VM) or the secret key will not break the authentication of the VM template.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed work, we first created VM templates of difference sizes. A VM template of Windows Server 2003 (with no additional applications) are generated using VMware vCenter 5.5. The size of the virtual disk is 2.02 GB and is labeled as 'small' in this study. A template of Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, with LAMP server, mySQL server installed with default databases are generated using the same approach. The size of the template is about 5.58 GB, and is labeled as 'Medium' in the study. We were not able to find exact VM template with a size significantly larger the Ubuntu server, so we artificially created a file with a size of 10.74GB to simulate a large .vmdk file. By varying the sizes of VM templates, crypto algorithms, and key sizes, we can gain better understanding if the time spent on cryptographically based authentication approach is practical in real world use. We should mention that the whole process of the proposed architecture's implementation has been done on two different platforms. A Mac Book Pro laptop and a PC desktop. The hardware specs of the testing machines are summarized in Table 1 . Mac was based on BSD kernel. So when measuring the time penalties, we can easily get reports on real %e, user %U, and sys %S, which corresponding to elapsed real time (in seconds), total number of CPU-seconds that the process spent in user mode, and total number of CPU-seconds that the process spent in kernel mode, respectively. However, in Windows Operating systems, it is not easy to retrieve time information in a similar format. Instead, only totally elapsed time was reported in only testing environment. So the results used in this study will be total elapsed time. We understand this is not the most accurate way to measure time cost by the encryption, but in real life, there was not a single system was designed to run crypto either. So, this imperfection in measuring can convincingly reflect the real overhead in a real system.
Hash Functions
In the first set of experiments, we measured the H(VM) with several major Cryptographic Hashing Functions [12] . We chose different hash function to be able to compare them and chose the best match for our proposed Architecture. Results of H(VM)'s Execution time are shown in the Table 2 . As seen from the results, the CPU processing time of hashing is basically linear to the size of the VM templates. SHA-384 and SHA-512 has similar processing time due to the fact the construction of the hashing are very similar. An interesting to note was SHA-256 process time is actually longer time than SHA-384 and SHA-512. This is because SHA-384 and SHA-512 are 64bit based and were designed specifically for the 64 bit computing environment, versus SHA-256 is 32 bit based. As a result, the number of blocks needed in SHA-384 and SHA-512 are only about half of the case in SHA-256. PC consistently scores better in the hashing category. Apparently, a more powerful processor helped in this process.
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Execution Time
In this section, execution time for E(k, VM || H(VM)) with SHA-512 are evaluated. For Symmetric Encryption, the secret key is generated with the following commands in the OpenSSL:
 openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048  openssl gendsa -out secretkey.pem dsaparam.pem
We chose different encryptions and decryptions to make a comparison between execution time of them. Thus, we will be able to find the best match for our presented architecture. Results of E(k, VM || H(VM))'s execution time are shown in the Table 2 . Results of Table 3 reinforced the common believe that 3DES is three times slower than DES whereas the processing time of AES is significantly less than that of 3DES. It can also be inferred from Table 3 that the processing time of the encryption is basically proportional to the size of the VM templates. Practically, two minutes overhead for authenticating a VM template of 10GB is certainly bearable for many businesses scenarios. In the encryption category, PC platform still has a better performance and mostly spend about 15%-20% less time to perform calculations.
The reverse process, D(E(k, VM || H(VM))), are shown in Table 4 . Mac shows similar trend in terms of processing time. Oddly, PC scores much worse than Mac and also is even much worse than its own encryption process. From theoretical point of view, the process time for symmetric encryption and decryption should be similar. We speculate the abnormal results might have something to do with how data was stored on hard drive. This because the .vmdk file was copied to a fairly empty partitions when the experiments begin. Chances are those data were stored in continuous blocks. When generating encrypted by using OpenSSL, it is likely the encrypted file are fragmented and saved to multiple data blocks. Mac has a SSD, which has great random read and write performance and is less likely subject to fragmented data problem. The PC has a regular hard drive, so fragmented the blocks could impact the performance greatly. Further investigations are needed to identify the root cause of slow decryption time on PC. 
Testing Accuracy of the Experiment
The execution time was much lower that we had expected for files at a size of 10GB. We had doubted about implementations and tried to do validate the implementations by Encrypting and Decrypting text files to see if the original messages can be obtained during the process .We were certain that the time we measured are within the normal range. In addition, we performed benchmarking tests on both computers. Findings are summarized in Table 5 . All the numbers represent how many bytes can be processed in 3 seconds, which means, the higher the number, the faster the processing time. For hashing algorithms, it is evident that system benefits greatly from large data block sizes. Since there are not many disk write operations, processors and the RAM are likely the factors that impact the results. In the case of encryption (des, 3des, and aes), there are two interesting observations. The first is that system does not perform any better when large data block were used. As a matter of fact, block sizes made no difference in our experiments. The second observation is that PC performs no better than Mac in the case of AES despite of its much powerful processor and much larger RAM. In particular, for the case of AES-256 encryption with 8KB block, SSD with less powerful CPU and RAM outperforms the HDD (cluster size 4KB) with more powerful CPU and RAM. While additional investigation is necessary, our hypothesis was that disk I/O performance might be the bottleneck of the AES-256 encryption on OpenSSL (version 0.97) implementations and having block size larger than the cluster size of the file system will slow down the operations on a HDD based system. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
VM template authentication approach proposed in current literature includes digital signature, hash functions or MAC. However, using only one of them cannot make the highest security. For example, by disclosure of the private key in the Digital Signature method, an attacker is able to temper the VM template easily. Due to the extreme importance of VM templates, we proposed a feasible approach to the problem of VM template authentication. Our work differs from existing work in that a cryptographic architecture for VM template authentication in IaaS environment is proposed with strong authentication and acceptable performance. Since both digital signature and hash value are required for VM Template authentication, attackers need to break both the encrypted VM template and be able to modify the secure hashing value of the VM template. The proposed architecture is therefore providing strong authentication and better security protection.
From security perspective, we also recommend that Cloud Providers to follow the practices listed below:
 The Cloud Consumer should use SSL or SSH to establish a secure session with the VM template integrity verification engine.  Users must encrypt EVERYTHING at every level in the cloud.  Users need to design a backup structure that enables them to pull their entire application state out of one cloud into another cloud, a managed hosting infrastructure, or their own office.  In particular, a user should be able to start up his/her entire application from his/her offsite back at another location with minimal trouble.  Users need to pay more attention in keeping keys secure.  We recommend Using SHA-512 as a hash function and AES as an Encryption/Decryption for striking the balance of high security and great performance.
We are also interested in investigating more about the role of user vulnerabilities across Cloud Environment. Moreover, we would like to test our proposed architecture on a high performancecomputing environment to see how it impacts the results on the server platform. In addition, we are interested in evaluate how network traffic impact the performance of proposed architecture.
From pedagogy perspective, this course project encourages students to become the master of the subject by encourage them to create and evaluate a solution in the real world settings. Due to time constraints, formal assessment was not conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the approach. In future, more types of instruments need to be designed and implemented to measure students' true learning outcomes.
